# Discussion: Identifying Preference for Early Resolution from Asset Prices

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#### Background

- Utility is the cornerstone of economic and financial theory, but it is very hard to provide direct evidence without lab experiment
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- Asset price data can be informative about preference properties
  - A long-run risk model requires IES > 1 and preference of early resolution of uncertainty to match the equity market facts
- Limitation
  - The evidence is highly model dependent and thus indirect
- This paper provides a model-free methodology to test preference of early/late resolution of uncertainty and show empirical results

#### Preference for Early/Late Resolution of Uncertainty

#### Figure 1: Early and late resolution of uncertainty



#### This Paper: Is Early Resolution Good or Bad?

#### Figure 2: Resolution of information quality



- If 0<sub>E</sub> is good, then any asset whose payoff is higher in state 0<sub>E</sub> should earn positive risk premium
- Period-0 state measured by information precision

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- Interpretation
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- Choice of asset: claim to volatility with short maturity
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- Information period: 5 weekdays before announcement
- Empirical result
  - The asset chosen has higher risk premium during the information period than an average day
  - Indicating preference of early resolution of uncertainty

#### **Overall Assessment**

- A great paper, very smart idea
- An excellent example on how asset price data are informative about economic fundamentals (preference in this paper)
  - Along the research agenda by Ai and Bansal (2018)
- Very careful empirical implementation
- Clear exposition, easy to follow (despite highly theoretical), lots of examples and discussions

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- Empirics:  $0_E$  is proxied by signals of an informed announcement
- Though seemingly straightforward, I would like to see a formal proof of the equivalence

#### An Illustration

$$\Delta y_{t+1} = \mu_t + \sigma_y \varepsilon_{y,t+1}$$

where  $\mu_t$  is unobserved and follows

$$\mu_t = \rho_\mu \mu_{t-1} + \sigma_\mu \varepsilon_{\mu,t}$$

 $s_t$  is a signal of the expected growth

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- Concern: signal precision affects both posterior volatility and mean
- Should be fine if prior is not systematically biased
- But would be good see a formal proof

#### Comment #2 Why is VIX Reduced aross Announcement?

- This paper: VIX drop across announcement is due to macro uncertainty resolution
  - Other reasons: change of risk appetite, especially institutional investors
  - Much evidence on monetary policy's risk-taking effect (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Agrippino and Rey, 2020), which may endogenously increase VIX without changing perceived consumption growth uncertainty

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  - Other announcements, like inflation, employment?

### Comment #3 Heterogeneity (1): Heterogeneity Preference

- This paper assumes a representative agent
- To what extent this result applies to a setting with heterogeneous agents and complete market
  - CRRA: simple aggregation into a CRRA rep agent (Huang, 1985)
  - Recursive utility: less trivial (Dumas, Uppal and Wang, 2000)
  - More general utility: Does preference of early resolution of uncertainty aggregate across heterogeneous agents?

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- Disagreement is pervasive before policy announcement
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- Alternative: the resolution of disagreement, instead of the resolution of uncertainty, drives the VIX reduction
- Conceptually, disagreement and uncertainty are different
- They are linked in a particular way (Dumas, Kirshev and Uppal 2009)
  - Two agents agree to disagree on how to interpret signals
  - If high disagreement implies high VIX and consumption growth uncertainty, the result is generalized to a setting with disagreement

#### Conclusion

- Smart design and solid empirical analysis
- Show direct evidence of preference of early resolution of uncertainty
- An excellent example of asset prices informative on primitives
- Comments
  - Equivalent between PER and happy with precise signal
  - What leads to VIX reduction across announcement
  - Generalization to a setting with heterogeneity: Heterogeneous preference and heterogeneous belief